SUMARIO

JUAN DUNS ESCOTO: LA SUTILEZA DE FE Y RAZÓN
Presentación: Homenaje a Isidoro Guzmán Manzano, ofm
Bernardo Pérez Andreo (Dir.)

Presentación del monográfico
Vicente Llamas Roig y Manuel Lázaro Pulido (Coords.) .. xvi-xvii

Isidoro Guzmán Manzano
El Primado absoluto de Cristo, piedra angular de la cristología de Escoto I .. 293-316

SECCIÓN TEOLÓGICA

Francesco Fiorentino
Filosofía e teología in Duns Scoto ........................................ 317-346

Olivier Boulois
La déduction de la Trinité selon Duns Scot ................................ 347-373

Manuel Lázaro Pulido
Cristologismo escotista vs. cristocentrismo bonaventuriano: Esquemas filosóficos franciscanos subyacentes. En torno a la cuestión del objeto de la teología ........ 375-404

Richard Cross
Dependence and Christological predication ................................ 405-418

SECCIÓN FILOSÓFICA

Vicente Llamas Roig
Adversus Scotum: Del objetivismo especular al singularismo gnoseológico ........ 419-455

Alessandro Ghisalberti
Essere infinito e univocità dell’essere nella metafisica di Duns Scoto ....... 457-478

Francisco León Florido
La distinción formal de Duns Escoto y los orígenes del formalismo político moderno ................................................................. 479-500

Leopoldo Prieto López
Suárez sobre el imperio como constitutivo formal de la ley: de Escoto a Kant ........ 501-526

DOCUMENTA

Bernardo Pérez Andreo
Bibliografía de Isidoro Guzmán Manzano, ofm .............................. 527-529

Manuel Lázaro Pulido y Vicente Llamas Roig
Bibliografía sobre Juan Duns Escoto en español ............................. 531-539

BIBLIOGRAFÍA ................................................................. 541-579

LIBROS RECIBIDOS ....................................................... 581-582

ÍNDICE DEL VOLUMEN .................................................. 583-586
DEPENDENCIA Y PREDICACIÓN EN CRISTOLÓGICA

RICHARD CROSS
John A. O’Brien Professor of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
University of Notre Dame (Indiana)
richard.cross@nd.edu

Enviado 10 de diciembre de 2019 / Aceptado

Resumen: Escoto declara que la naturaleza humana de Cristo depende, como comunicable, de la segunda figura trinitaria, en modo semejante a la dependencia del accidente respecto a la sustancia. Sostiene asimismo que las inherencias a esa naturaleza dependen de su suppositum. Este artículo deniega a tales dependencias el carácter transitivo que asiste a algunas relaciones de predicación sobre la teórica no autosuficiencia objetiva de la naturaleza, acercando la posición de Escoto a la de Zwinglio.

Palabras clave: Dependencia, naturaleza, persona, anti-transitividad, verificador.

Abstract: Scotus claims that Christ’s human nature depends on the second person of the Trinity (he describes a relationship of dependence that a nature, as communicable, has on its suppositum) in a way analogous to that in which an accident depends on a substance. He also claims that Christ’s human accidents depend on Christ’s human nature. This article addresses whether or not these dependence relations are transitive, and concludes that Scotus denied the transitivity of such dependence relations in order to bring him closer to Zwingli’s view -not Luther’s-, regarding the Christological question.

Keywords: Dependence, nature, person, antitransitive, truth-maker.
One of the most important Christological debates between the first-generation Reformers was the question of whether or not the incarnate divine person was, in addition to being the linguistic subject of his human accidents, their ontological subject as well. Luther, for instance, expressly states that the divine person bears his human accidents:

Because God and Man are one sole person, it must be said that the person of Christ bears (führt) the properties of the two natures. . . . Hence, that which appertains (zugehören) individually to one of the natures must be ascribed and attributed (zuschreiben und zeigen) to the whole person.¹

Indeed, Luther holds that anyone maintaining the opposite is a Nestorian, affirming two persons in Christ: a divine person, the ontological subject merely of divine attributes, and a human person, the ontological subject merely of human attributes.² His opponent, Zwingli, maintains just as strongly, contrariwise, that the divine person cannot be the ontological subject of human accidents, since affirming that he is would amount to monophysitism, confusing the two natures in Christ.³ Zwingli’s view is expressed with exceptional clarity by one of his Reformed followers, the theologian Peter Martyr Vermigli, who expressly rejects the following Lutheran view: ‘The Son of God . . . suffered and died in the sense that the passion and death sprang from the human nature but nonetheless so that they reached (peruenerint) to the Word itself and reached in such a way that the Word truly suffered and died’.⁴ According to Vermigli, we should claim that only the human nature is the ontological subject of the relevant properties, albeit that they can be truly predicated of the divine person: ‘I affirm that these

² Martin Luther, Von den Konzilis und Kirchen, in Luther, Werke, I, 588.7-11.
communications are verbal, because the properties cannot in reality pertain to both natures. But they are not verbal in such a way that they should not be conceded and received as true, provided that there is a good reason.5

It seems to me that the views of the medieval theologians are by no means so clearly delineated as those of their early modern successors, and in what follows I shall explore this question by looking at what Scotus has to say on the matter. To do so, I shall examine what Scotus says about the nature of various extra-linguistic predication-grounding relations in this context. (An example: the relation of bearing, which we have already see Luther appeal to.) Since both the medieval theologians and relevant sides in the later dispute accepted both that Christ’s human nature bore his human accidents and that Christ bore his human nature, the question that will most predominantly occupy me here is whether or not the relevant predication-grounding relations are transitive. As we shall see, Scotus’s treatment of the issues is not wholly transparent, and rather suggests that he has not devoted the kind of systematic attention to the question that we later find in Luther and Zwingli, cum suis.

The issue makes a difference to question of Christological coherence, and this is one reason for wanting to explore it further. If we suppose that the second person of the Trinity is the ontological, as well as the linguistic, subject of human properties, we seem to be confronted rather forcibly with the problem of Christological contradictions. For example, Christ is supposed to be divine and human, and thus immutable and mutable. One way of dealing with this is to claim that these two predicates simply mean that Christ has a nature that is immutable, and Christ has a nature that is mutable.6 But the usefulness of this strategy is undermined, it seems to me, if the relevant properties are borne by the divine person (as well as being borne by the natures). Christ’s divine and human natures, after all, are not parts, and we cannot appeal to some kind of spatial or physical demarcation or delimitation to block possible contradictions: for example, the thought that one object can bear contrary properties in virtue of its distinct parts bearing contrary properties. (Body and soul, I take it – respectively material and immaterial parts of one human person, or plausibly so – are spatially distinct at least in the sense that the one does, and the other does not, occupy space.)

5 Vermigli, Dialogus, fol. 29r; Donnelly, 51, altered. For Vermigli’s Christology, see my Communicatio Idiomatum, 142-5.
Typically, there is a sense in which the natures are *had* by the divine person, and, in the case of the human nature, *borne* by that person in much the same way as an accident is borne by its subject.

In his Christological discussions, Scotus identifies three possible candidates for the predication-grounding relation: informing, depending, and being communicated. The context is an exploration of the ways in which the divine person might be said to bear his human nature. Scotus spells out what is involved in the first two candidate predication-grounding relations (informing and depending) as follows:

Although it is difficult to see that some dependence could be such, nevertheless all of this can be made clear in some way in a subject and an accident. For an accident has a two-fold relation to its subject or to its substance: namely, [1] of what informs to what is informed (and this necessarily includes imperfection in the informed subject, in that [the subject] has some potentiality with respect to qualified (because accidental) act). It [2] has another [relation] as of what is naturally posterior to what is prior (on which it depends as on a subject, rather than as a cause, because if it has the subject as some kind of cause, it has it as a material cause, and this to the extent that it informs it). If therefore these two relations between an accident and a subject are distinguished from each other, the one is necessarily directed to a subject under the notion of imperfection in the subject, namely, potentiality, whereas the other does not necessarily posit any imperfection in [the subject], but merely natural priority and sustaining (*substantificationem*) with relation to the accident. And the relation which is the dependence of the human nature on the divine person is most similar to this [relation of accidental dependence].

The human nature cannot inform the divine person, since ‘informing’ is a technical term for a relation that involves the actualization of potentiality in a subject: and God is pure act, lacking all potentiality. But it can depend on the divine person in the way in which an accident depends on its substance. The relevant sense of ‘dependence’ is not causal, since every cause-effect

---

relation between God and creatures has the entire Trinity as its end term, and only one divine person is incarnate. And, unlike causal dependence relations, the relevant dependence relation is sufficient to ground predication (‘is man’ predicated of the divine person, and accidents predicated of their substances):

Although not every dependence is sufficient for making true a predication of what depends on what it depends on, that [dependence] which is of a nature, as communicable, on a suppositum, as hypostatically sustaining [the nature], is sufficient for making true a predication of the nature (thus dependent) of the suppositum on which it depends. This is clear in the case of an accident (thus dependent) on the suppositum of the substance on which it depends.\(^8\)

The idea is that the relevant dependence/sustaining relations are sufficient for predication: if whiteness depends on Socrates, then it is true that Socrates is white, and if a human nature depends on the divine person (here labelled a ‘suppositum’, the technical Scholastic term for something that cannot depend in the relevant way), then it is true that that person is man. So here it is apparently dependence, not informing, that in some sense grounds the predication relation in these cases.

In the text just quoted, Scotus introduces the third notion of interest here: communication. It turns out, in fact, that communication is the notion that distinguishes this kind of dependence from other forms: ‘The unity or union of the human nature to the Word is a certain dependence, or consists in the kind of dependence that a nature, as communicable, has to some incommunicable subsistent’.\(^9\)

What is communication? Scotus discerns two basic types:

Something is said to be communicable either by identity, such that that to which it is communicated is it, or by information, such that that to which it is communicated is not it, but is by it. In the first way the universal is communicated to the singular, and in the second way form to matter. Thus a nature, as it in itself and in its definition, is communicable in either way, that is to many supposita such that each of them is it, and also as that by which (quo), as a form, by which

---

\(^8\) Duns Scotus, Quodlibetum [= Quod.], q. 19, n. 15, in Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia, ed. L. Wadding, 12 vols (Lyons, 1639), XII, 513.

\(^9\) Duns Scotus, Quod., q. 19, n. 3 (Wadding ed., XII, 493).
the singular or *supposition* is a being in a quidditative way, or has a nature. And a *supposition* is incommunicable by the opposed two-fold incommunicability.\(^{10}\)

The first kind of communicability — let me label it ‘communicability *ut quod*’ — is the relation that obtains between a whole individual essence and the *supposition* of which it is an essence. Spelling this relation out requires a great deal of Scotist metaphysics that would distract me from my purpose here, so I ignore it in what follows. The second kind — let me label it ‘communicability *ut quo*’ — is relevant to the question of predication, since it is that by which something ‘is a being in a quidditative way’: it is that which explains the fact that something is of a given kind, or has a particular accidental feature, and is thus that which grounds the truths of the kinds of predication that are relevant to the Christological cases that I am considering here.

There is something unhelpful about Scotus’s discussion thus far, however, since in the second passage from Scotus quoted above he spells out dependence without information in terms of communicability; and here the relevant kind of communicability is spelled out in terms of informing. Clearly, the Christological case requires Scotus to finesse his account, and I take it that he would say that what is relevant in communication *ut quo* is precisely that it is the relation that grounds predication, or that does *so ceteris paribus*, in the absence of some other block on predication. Communication, in other words, is the truth-making relation, misleadingly associated in the first passage with informing; dependence, whatever it is, is something distinct from this, and if it has a truth-making function that function is parasitic on, and perhaps reducible to, the truth-making function ascribed to communication.

Given all this, then, in order to work out how to place Scotus’s view in the context of later debates we need to work out which of these various relations is transitive, or at any rate which ones fail to be antitransitive. For example, if an accident depends on Christ’s human nature and that nature depends on the divine person, does it follow that the accident depends on the divine person, in at least some cases? And, if so, supposing that each of the first two these two dependence relations — that of the nature on the person, and that of the accident on the nature — is sufficient for predication, is it the case that the third dependence — that of the accident on the person — is sufficient for predication? And, likewise, if an accident is communicated to Christ’s human nature and that nature is communicated to the divine person,

---

does it follow that the accident is communicated to the divine person, in at least some cases? And, if so, supposing that each of the first two of these communication relations is sufficient for predication, is the third likewise sufficient?

One relation that clearly is transitive is that of informing. To inform is to be a formal cause, and to be a subject of such informing is to be a material cause.\(^{11}\) Equally, Scotus is explicit that these kinds of relation are transitive.\(^{12}\) But, as we have already seen, this relation is one that Scotus wishes to exclude from the Christological case, so we can bracket it in what follows.

Dependence is clearly not antitransitive, since Scotus is explicit that there are some cases in which the dependence relations between the divine person and the human nature, and the human nature and human accidents, are sufficient for a dependence relation between the human accident and the divine person:

> While the dependence of an accident [of Christ] is somehow upon the singular substance [viz. Christ’s human nature], it only ends with the singular as incommunicable [viz. the divine person]. For if it depends on the singular substance as communicable (since this substance is the being of that to which it is communicated), the dependence only ends with the latter.\(^{13}\)

But this passage does not make it plain whether the dependence of the accident on the divine person is sufficient for predication. After all, what Scotus writes, both here and in the second displayed passage from Scotus quoted above, is consistent with the following scenario: the human nature depends on, and is predicatable, of the divine person; human accidents depend on, and are predicatable of, the human nature; and human accidents depend on the divine person but are not predicatable of that person. And, more importantly given the desiderata of the theological doctrine, it is consistent with the following variant too: the human accidents depend on the divine person, and are predicatable of that person; but it is not the case that this last predicability relation is sufficiently secured by the dependence relation – it is not in virtue of the dependence relation that the accidents are predicated of the divine person.

---

\(^{11}\) See Duns Scotus, Lect. II, d. 12, q. un., n. 21 (Vatican ed., XIX, 76).


\(^{13}\) Duns Scotus, Quod., q. 19, n. 13 (Wadding ed., XII, 505).
In this passage, dependence is transitive. But the text makes clear that there is in addition to this an ontological communication relation between the human nature and the divine person; and there seems to be no parallel ontological communication between human accidents and the divine person. Indeed, despite his clear affirmation of a dependence relation between the human accidents and the divine person, Scotus always treats the communication relation between the human accidents and the divine person as a simply linguistic matter. Following the standard theological practice of his day, he refers to the relation obtaining between the divine person and his human accidents as a case of communication, the so-called *communicatio idiomatum*, or communication of properties, and persistently treats it as a merely linguistic relation. So here, it seems, that the metaphysical communication relation is plausibly seen as antitransitive according to Scotus.

The clearest case is the discussion of Christ’s human will. The context is an objection to the view that Christ could have both a divine and a human will. The objector reasons that Christ’s human will could not be ‘in control of its act’, since either it would be ruled by the divine will of the second person of the Trinity, or it could act unjustly – and the first is incompatible with the will’s necessary freedom, and the second with being the will of a divine person. ¹⁴

Scotus’s reply is worth quoting at length:

I concede that something cannot be a will unless it is in control of its act, and in this way the will in Christ is in control of its act just as in any other human being, because the will of the Word does not cause Christ’s volition, according to his human nature, in any way other than the whole Trinity does with respect to my volition, since he permits the human will to elicit its act as freely as he permits other wills to elicit theirs. . . .

You will say that the Word, but not the Father of Holy Spirit, is said to be willing by the volition of Christ’s soul; therefore it must be related to that volition more particularly than the whole Trinity [is].

I say that this is the first prediction that is true in this matter: ‘The Word is man’; and from this the following is true: ‘The Son of God died *qua* man’, and ‘The Son of God is willing by the human will’. If therefore the truth of the first proposition requires neither the Word’s special efficacy nor denomination to make ‘The Word is man’ true, neither [is] any [required to make] the others [true], which are true

merely from the first truth. But for this, ‘The Word is man’, there is no special action which is not of the whole Trinity.

How, therefore, is [the Word] called ‘willing’? I say that just as the Son of God is called ‘coloured’ because the body of Christ is coloured, so he is called ‘willing’ because the soul is willing, and because the nature subsists in the Word, who is for this reason thus denominated.\(^{15}\)

As Scotus puts it in a parallel discussion, ‘The Word, and not the whole Trinity, is denominated by the operation of the created will on account of the union which results in the communication of properties (\textit{communicationem idiomatum}).\(^{16}\)

The crucial point is in the final paragraph here: what it is for ‘the Word is willing’ to be true is for the Word to sustain a nature that wills (‘because the soul is willing, and because the nature subsists in the Word’: where the first clause entails that the nature wills, and the second means that the Word sustains the nature). So here we can have true predication apparently without the real communication of the property to the Word. The first paragraph aims to show that there is no direct ontological relation between the Word and the relevant human property. Christ’s human will is as autonomous as mine. To the worry that this lack of ontological relation means that the relevant Christological predication (‘the Word is willing’) is false, Scotus objects that other Christological locutions do not require any special causal activity on the part of the second person of the Trinity (as opposed to the whole Trinity), and thus that ‘the Word is willing’ does not require any such either. For my purposes, the important thing to note is that the predication does not require any ontological communication of the property – the activity of willing – to the divine person either. The property is ontologically communicated to the human nature, and the human nature is ontologically communicated to the Word. But there is no ontological communication of the human accident to the divine person, and the linguistic predication relation is grounded simply in the pair of ontological communications from the human nature to the Word, and from the human accident to the divine person.

Admittedly, this does not show that ontological communication is strictly speaking antitransitive. The best it shows is that it is not transitive in all cases. Of course, this claim about ontological communication is

\(^{15}\) Duns Scotus, \textit{Rep.} III, d. 17, q. 1, n. 4 (Wadding ed., XI, 484).

\(^{16}\) Duns Scotus, \textit{Ord.} III, d. 17, q. un., n. 17 (Vatican ed., IX, 570). On this, see my \textit{Metaphysics of the Incarnation}, 221-2; see too 198-205.
quite independent of linguistic communication in the sense outlined: this relation is just denomination, and in at least some cases denomination is transitive.

As the text makes clear, the locution ‘The Son of God is willing by the human will’ means that the Son of God has a human nature, and that nature wills such-and-such. We should interpret the _qua_ -connective in line with this: ‘The Son of God died _qua_ man’ means that the Son of God has a human nature, and that nature dies. Scotus elsewhere makes a similar point about the claim ‘The Word is a suffering man’, where suffering is ‘a passion that is in [the Word] according to the human nature’:

> Contingent truths said of Christ . . . have some subject of which they are immediately and primarily said, and that subject is the Word. For the theological truths about the incarnation are these: ‘The Word is made man’, ‘the Word is born man’, ‘the Word is a suffering man (homo passus)’. . . . When you say that a passion is in [the Word] according to the human nature, I say that the humanity is not the thing which is first characterized as the subject (humanitas non est prima ratio subiecti) in which the analysis comes to an end (ad quam stet resolutio), but is as it were a prior passion, mediating between the first subject of these truths, which is the Word, and other posterior passions, such as ‘born’, and so on.17

The point here is that what makes it true that ‘the Word is a suffering man’ (for example) is that the human nature suffers. This suffering is a passion of that nature, and the nature is in turn a passion of the person. But all Scotus affirms about the relation between the Word and suffering is that suffering is ‘said of’ the Word (a linguistic relation), and said ‘immediately and primarily’ because there is no real or linguistic subject underlying the Word. ‘Immediately’ here is admittedly odd, since Scotus later suggests that the humanity is something ‘mediating’ between the Word and the relevant passion. What Scotus means to exclude is the thought that the predication ‘this man was crucified’ (for example) might be true ‘without implying the Word in the subject’: the relevant theological truth is ‘the Word is the crucified man’, albeit that it is true in virtue of the human nature’s being crucified.18 Here, then, Scotus is again interested in the predication relation, and nothing he says suggests that he thinks the relevant human properties

are passions of the divine person. Being a passion of (being a necessary or inseparable accident, or something like such an accident) is here not transitive.

As we have seen, Scotus describes the dependence relation that he is interested in as the dependence ‘of a nature, as communicable, on a suppositum’, and holds that an analogous relation obtains between an accident and a nature. But can dependence be transitive and communication not be, given that dependence is described in terms of communication? One thing to keep in mind is that Scotus never offers a definition of the notion of dependence that he is interested in. But if he were to, it would be distinct from communication, since as he spells out the notion of communication it involves that of truth-making. Now, passages I have quoted thus far both associate and dissociate dependence and truth-making. Perhaps we could speculate that dependence is (sometimes) associated with truth-making since it entails communication (unless blocked—e.g. by failure of transitivity in the latter case).

I have been presupposing here that at least some predication relations are transitive—that is to say, if an item has a nature that is q, then that item is q. As I put it above, ‘in at least some cases, denomination is transitive’. This obviously cannot be the case for all predication relations (think of spatial predicates, for example, or of predications in which ‘q’ expresses something structural about the nature—for example, ‘being a nature of’). Scotus thinks that there are some very general predicates, not kind-specific, that would equally be ascribed to persons and to natures. The case that he discusses at length is ‘creature’. We should not say that Christ is a creature, even though his human nature is, ‘since “this which is a creature” is naturally said of things generally, as much of a suppositum as of a nature’, and so ‘it will not denominate a suppositum by reason of a nature unless it pertains to the suppositum by proper denomination’. And ‘it does not pertain to this suppositum . . . since the suppositum of the Word is not a creature, since he is the creator’.19 Here, then, denomination fails to be transitive.

It is fair to say that Scotus’s overall discussion is remarkably unsystematic: the issue which was the initial major flashpoint in the controversy between Luther and Zwingli does not seem to have been one to which he devoted any sustained attention, and perhaps simply had not cropped up as a disputed topic until the sixteenth century. It seems to me that if we focus on the discussions of dependence, then what Scotus says seems prima facie

---

19 Duns Scotus, Ord. III, d. 11, q. 1, n. 32 (Vatican ed. IX, 361).
more in line with Luther’s view, and that if we focus on the communication language, what he says seems to suggest something more like Zwingli’s view. Neither Luther nor Zwingli has an account of properties sufficient nuanced to enable us to work out where they situate Scotus relative to their positions: indeed, it is fair to say that neither of them has an account of properties at all – albeit that Luther occasionally gives lists of the kinds of thing that he counts as properties.²⁰

What would we say? I have argued that the predication-grounding relation for Scotus is communication. And I have focused on this relation since it seems to me that a plausible account of the kinds of properties that all sides in my debate were interested in – particularized accidents – would make the defining feature of such things their function as truth-makers. The classic modern account – Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, and Barry Smith, ‘Truth-Makers’²¹ – has it that truth-makers are items called ‘moments’ (following the usage of Husserl). A moment is «an existentially dependent or non-self-sufficient object, that is, an object which is of such a nature that it cannot exist alone, but requires the existence of some other object outside itself»²². Moments include but are not restricted to Aristotelian accidents.²³ As Mulligan, Simons, and Smith see it,

For many simple sentences about spatio-temporal objects the truth-maker for these sentences are the moments picked out by gerunds and other nominalised expressions closely related to the main verbs of the sentences in question. In place of Tarski-biconditionals of the form: “‘This cube is white’ is true iff this cube is white”, we thereby obtain – at least in simple cases – sentences of the form “If “This cube is white” is true, then it is true in virtue of the being white (the whiteness) of this cube, and if no such whiteness exists, then “This cube is white” is false.”²⁴

The point here is that what makes the relevant sentences true are not facts but the moments of a given independent object. And truth-making is evidently parasitic on dependence (of the right kind). But the point I wish to

²⁰ Martin Luther, Von den Konz. (Werke, 1., 587.22-31).
take away from this brief discussion is that truth-making is the mark of being a property of, and that truth-making is thus the mark of what we would label ‘bearing’; for $x$ to bear a property $\varphi$ is for a particularized $\varphi$-ness to be a truth-maker for sentences of the form ‘$x$ is $\varphi$’. And if we think of properties as truth-makers, we will be inclined to think that communication is salient to the question of what counts as a property as a constituent of reality, and that for a property to be borne is for that property to communicate to its subject in such a way as to ground predication. Scotus’s talk of dependence, on this analysis, is despite initial appearances to the contrary just a way of talking about the subject as a necessary condition for the reality of the property: it is not, as it turns out, a way of specifying the property-specific bearing-relation that obtains between the subject and its properties. And if this is correct, then we should ultimately put Scotus in the Zwingli camp, not the Luther camp, on the Christological question.
Bibliography


